I. ON PREDESTINATION
The
first and most important article in religion on which I have to offer my
views, and which for many years past has engaged my attention, is the Predestination
of God, that is, the Election of men to salvation, and the Reprobation of
them to destruction. Commencing with this article, I will first explain
what is taught concerning it, both in discourses and writings, by certain
persons in our Churches, and in the University of Leyden. I will afterwards
declare my own views and thoughts on the same subject, while I shew my opinion
on what they advance.
On this article there is no uniform and simple opinion among the teachers
of our Churches; but there is some variation in certain parts of it in which
they differ from each other.
1. The first opinion, which I reject, but which is espoused by those [Supralapsarians]
who assume the very highest ground of this Predestination.
The opinion of those who take the highest ground on this point, as it is
generally contained in their writings, is to this effect:
"I. God by an eternal and immutable decree has predestinated, from
among men, (whom he did not consider as being then created, much less as
being fallen,) certain individuals to everlasting life, and others to eternal
destruction, without any regard whatever to righteousness or sin, to obedience
or disobedience, but purely of his own good pleasure, to demonstrate the
glory of his justice and mercy; or, (as others assert,) to demonstrate his
saving grace, wisdom and free uncontrollable power.
"II. In addition to this decree, God has pre-ordained certain determinate
means which pertain to its execution, and this by an eternal and immutable
decree. These means necessarily follow by virtue of the preceding decree,
and necessarily bring him who has been predestinated, to the end which has
been fore-ordained for him. Some of these means belong in common both to
the decree of election and that of rejection, and others of them are specially
restricted to the one decree or to the other.
"III. The means common to both the decrees, are three: the first is,
the creation of man in the upright [or erect] state of original righteousness,
or after the image and likeness of God in righteousness and true holiness.
The second is, the permission of the fall of Adam, or the ordination of
God that man should sin, and become corrupt or vitiated. The third is, the
loss or the removal of original righteousness and of the image of God, and
a being concluded under sin and condemnation.
"IV. For unless God had created some men, he would not have had any
upon whom he might either bestow eternal life, or superinduce everlasting
death. Unless he had created them in righteousness and true holiness, he
would himself have been the author of sin, and would by this means have
possessed no right either to punish them to the praise of his justice, or
to save them to the praise of his mercy. Unless they had themselves sinned,
and by the demerit of sin had rendered themselves guilty of death, there
would have been no room for the demonstration either of justice or of mercy.
"V. The means pre-ordained for the execution of the decree of election,
are also these three. The first is, the pre- ordination, or the giving of
Jesus Christ as a Mediator and a saviour, who might by his meet deserve,
[or purchase,] for all the elect and for them only, the lost righteousness
and life, and might communicate them by his own power [Or virtue]. The second
is, the call [or vocation] to faith outwardly by the word, but inwardly
by his Spirit, in the mind, affections and will; by an operation of such
efficacy that the elect person of necessity yields assent and obedience
to the vocation, in so much that it is not possible for him to do otherwise
than believe and be obedient to this vocation. From hence arise justification
and sanctification through the blood of Christ and his Spirit, and from
them the existence of all good works. And all that, manifestly by means
of the same force and necessity. The third is, that which keeps and preserves
the elect in faith, holiness, and a zeal for good works; or, it is the gift
of perseverance; the virtue of which is such, that believing and elect persons
not only do not sin with a full and entire will, or do not fall away totally
from faith and grace, but it likewise is neither possible for them to sin
with a full and perfect will, nor to fall away totally or finally from faith
and grace.
"VI. The two last of these means [vocation and perseverance,] belong
only to the elect who are of adult age. But God employs a shorter way to
salvation, by which he conducts those children of believers and saints who
depart out of this life before they arrive at years of maturity; that is,
provided they belong to the number of the elect, (who are known to God alone,)
for God bestows on them Christ as their saviour, and gives them to Christ,
to save them by his blood and Holy Spirit, without actual faith and perseverance
in it [faith]; and this he does according to the promise of the covenant
of grace, I will be a God unto you, and unto your seed after you.
"VII. The means pertaining to the execution of the decree of reprobation
to eternal death, are partly such as peculiarly belong to all those who
are rejected and reprobate, whether they ever arrive at years of maturity
or die before that period; and they are partly such as are proper only to
some of them. The mean that is common to all the reprobate, is desertion
in sin, by denying to them that saving grace which is sufficient and necessary
to the salvation of any one. This negation [or denial,] consists of two
parts. For, in the first place, God did not will that Christ should die
for them [the reprobate,] or become their saviour, and this neither in reference
to the antecedent will of God, (as some persons call it,) nor in reference
to his sufficient will, or the value of the price of reconciliation; because
this price was not offered for reprobates, either with respect to the decree
of God, or its virtue and efficacy. (1.) But the other part of this negation
[or denial] is, that God is unwilling to communicate the Spirit of Christ
to reprobates, yet without such communication they can neither be made partakers
of Christ nor of his benefits.
"VIII. The mean which belongs properly only to some of the reprobates,
is obduration, [or the act of hardening,] which befalls those of them who
have attained to years of maturity, either because they have very frequently
and enormously sinned against the law of God, or because they have rejected
the grace of the gospel. (1.) To the execution of the first species of induration,
or hardening, belong the illumination of their conscience by means of knowledge,
and its conviction of the righteousness of the law. For it is impossible
that this law should not necessarily detain them in unrighteousness, to
render them inexcusable. (2.) For the execution of the second species of
induration, God employs a call by the preaching of his gospel, which call
is inefficacious and insufficient both in respect to the decree of God,
and to its issue or event. This calling is either only an external one,
which it is neither in their desire nor in their power to obey. Or it is
likewise an internal one, by which some of them may be excited in their
understandings to accept and believe the things which they hear; but yet
it is only with such a faith as that with which the devils are endowed when
they believe and tremble. Others of them are excited and conducted still
further, so as to desire in a certain measure to taste the heavenly gift.
But the latter are, of all others, the most unhappy, because they are raised
up on high, that they may be brought down with a heavier fall. And this
fate it is impossible for them to escape, for they must of necessity return
to their vomit, and depart or fall away from the faith. "9. "IX.
From this decree of Divine election and reprobation, and from this administration
of the means which pertain to the execution of both of them, it follows,
that the elect are necessarily saved, it being impossible for them to perish
-- and that the reprobate are necessarily damned, it being impossible for
them to be saved; and all this from the absolute purpose [or determination]
of God, which is altogether antecedent to all things, and to all those causes
which are either in things themselves or can possibly result from them."
These opinions concerning predestination are considered, by some of those
who advocate them, to be the foundation of Christianity, salvation and of
its certainty. On these sentiments they suppose, "is founded the sure
and undoubted consolation of all believers, which is capable of rendering
their consciences tranquil; and on them also depends the praise of the grace
of God, so that if any contradiction be offered to this doctrine, God is
necessarily deprived of the glory of his grace, and then the merit of salvation
is attributed to the free will of man and to his own powers and strength,
which ascription savours of Pelagianism."
These then are the causes which are offered why the advocates of these sentiments
labour with a common anxiety to retain the purity of such a doctrine in
their churches and why they oppose themselves to all those innovations which
are at variance with them.
2. MY SENTIMENTS ON THE PRECEDING SCHEME OF PREDESTINATION.
But, for my own part, to speak my sentiments with freedom, and yet with
a salvo in favour of a better judgment, I am of opinion, that this doctrine
of theirs contains many things that are both false and impertinent, and
at an utter disagreement with each other; all the instances of which, the
present time will not permit me to recount, but I will subject it to an
examination only in those parts which are most prominent and extensive.
I shall, therefore, propose to myself four principal heads, which are of
the greatest importance in this doctrine; and when I have in the first place
explained of what kind they are, I will afterwards declare more fully the
judgment and sentiments which I have formed concerning them. They are the
following:
"I. That God has absolutely and precisely decreed to save certain particular
men by his mercy or grace, but to condemn others by his justice: and to
do all this without having any regard in such decree to righteousness or
sin, obedience or disobedience, which could possibly exist on the part of
one class of men or of the other.
"II. That, for the execution of the preceding decree, God determined
to create Adam, and all men in him, in an upright state of original righteousness;
besides which he also ordained them to commit sin, that they might thus
become guilty of eternal condemnation and be deprived of original righteousness.
"III. That those persons whom God has thus positively willed to save,
he has decreed not only to salvation but also to the means which pertain
to it; (that is, to conduct and bring them to faith in Christ Jesus, and
to perseverance in that faith ;) and that He also in reality leads them
to these results by a grace and power that are irresistible, so that it
is not possible for them to do otherwise than believe, persevere in faith,
and be saved.
"IV. That to those whom, by his absolute will, God has fore- ordained
to perdition, he has also decreed to deny that grace which is necessary
and sufficient for salvation, and does not in reality confer it upon them;
so that they are neither placed in a possible condition nor in any capacity
of believing or of being saved."
After a diligent contemplation and examination of these four heads, in the
fear of the Lord, I make the following declaration respecting this doctrine
of predestination.
3. I REJECT THIS PREDESTINATION FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
I.
Because it is not the foundation of Christianity, of Salvation, or of its
certainty.
1. It is not the foundation of Christianity: (1.) For this Predestination
is not that decree of God by which Christ is appointed by God to be the
saviour, the Head, and the Foundation of those who will be made heirs of
salvation. Yet that decree is the only foundation of Christianity. (2.)
For the doctrine of this Predestination is not that doctrine by which, through
faith, we as lively stones are built up into Christ, the only corner stone,
and are inserted into him as the members of the body are joined to their
head.
2. It is not the foundation of Salvation: (1.) For this Predestination is
not that decree of the good pleasure of God in Christ Jesus on which alone
our salvation rests and depends. (2.) The doctrine of this Predestination
is not the foundation of Salvation: for it is not "the power of God
to salvation to every one that believeth :" because through it "the
righteousness of God" is not "revealed from faith to faith."
3. Nor is it the foundation of the certainty of salvation: For that is dependent
upon this decree, "they who believe, shall be saved :" I believe,
therefore, I shall be saved. But the doctrine of this Predestination embraces
within itself neither the first nor the second member of the syllogism.
This is likewise confessed by some persons in these words: "we do not
wish to state that the knowledge of this [Predestination] is the foundation
of Christianity or of salvation, or that it is necessary to salvation in
the same manner as the doctrine of the Gospel," &c.
II. This doctrine of Predestination comprises within it neither the whole
nor any part of the Gospel. For, according to the tenor of the discourses
delivered by John and Christ, as they are described to us by the Evangelist,
and according to the doctrine of the Apostles and Christ after his ascension,
the Gospel consists partly of an injunction to repent and believe, and partly
of a promise to bestow forgiveness of sins, the grace of the Spirit, and
life eternal. But this Predestination belongs neither to the injunction
to repent and believe, nor to the annexed promise. Nay, this doctrine does
not even teach what kind of men in general God has predestinated, which
is properly the doctrine of the Gospel; but it embraces within itself a
certain mystery, which is known only to God, who is the Predestinater, and
in which mystery are comprehended what particular persons and how many he
has decreed to save and to condemn. From these premises I draw a further
conclusion, that this doctrine of Predestination is not necessary to salvation,
either as an object of knowledge, belief, hope, or performance. A Confession
to this effect has been made by a certain learned man, in the theses which
he has proposed for discussion on this subject, in the following words:
"Wherefore the gospel cannot be simply termed the book or the revelation
of Predestination, but only in a relative sense. Because it does not absolutely
denote either the matter of the number or the form; that is, it neither
declares how many persons in particular, nor (with a few exceptions,) who
they are, but only the description of them in general, whom God has predestinated."
III. This doctrine was never admitted, decreed, or approved in any Council,
either general or particular, for the first six hundred years after Christ.
1. Not in the General Council of Nice, in which sentence was given against
Arius and in favour of the Deity and Consubstantiality of the Son of God.
Not in the first Council of Constantinople, in which a decree was passed
against Macedonius, respecting the Deity of the Holy Spirit. Not in the
Council of Ephesus, which determined against Nestorius, and in favour of
the Unity of the Person of the Son of God. Not in that of Chalcedon, which
condemned Eutyches, and determined, "that in one and the same person
of our Lord Jesus Christ, there were two distinct natures, which differ
from each other in their essence." Not in the second Council of Constantinople,
in which Peter, Bishop of Antioch, and Anthymus, Bishop of Constantinople,
with certain other persons, were condemned for having asserted "that
the Father had likewise suffered," as well as the Son. Nor in the third
Council of Constantinople, in which the Monothelites were condemned for
having asserted "that there was only one will and operation in Jesus
Christ."
2. But this doctrine was not discussed or confirmed in particular Councils,
such as that of Jerusalem, Orange, or even that of Mela in Africa, which
was held against Pelagius and his errors, as is apparent from the articles
of doctrine which were then decreed both against his person and his false
opinions.
But so far was Augustine's doctrine of Predestination from being received
in those councils, that when Celestinus, the Bishop of Rome, who was his
contemporary, wrote to the Bishops of France, and condemned the doctrines
of the Pelagians, he concluded his epistle in these words: "but as
we dare not despise, so neither do we deem it necessary to defend the more
profound and difficult parts of the questions which occur in this controversy,
and which have been treated to a very great extent by those who opposed
the heretics. Because we believe, that whatever the writings according to
the forementioned rules of the Apostolic See have taught us, is amply sufficient
for confessing the grace of God, from whose work, credit and authority not
a little must be subtracted or withdrawn," &c. In reference to
the rules which were laid down by Celestinus in that epistle, and which
had been decreed in the three preceding particular Councils, we shall experience
no difficulty in agreeing together about them, especially in regard to those
matters which are necessary to the establishment of grace in opposition
to Pelagius and his errors.
IV. None of those Doctors or Divines of the Church who held correct and
orthodox sentiments for the first six hundred years after the birth of Christ,
ever brought this doctrine forward or gave it their approval. Neither was
it professed and approved by a single individual of those who shewed themselves
the principal and keenest defenders of grace against Pelagius. Of this description,
it is evident, were St. Jerome, Augustine, the author of the treatise entitled,
De Vocatione Gentium, ["The calling of the Gentiles,"] Prosper
of Aquitaine, Hilary, Fulgentius, and Orosius. This is very apparent from
their writings.
V. It neither agrees nor corresponds with the Harmony of those confessions
which were printed and published together in one volume at Geneva, in the
name of the Reformed and Protestant Churches. If that harmony of Confessions
be faithfully consulted, it will appear that many of them do not speak in
the same manner concerning Predestination; that some of them only incidentally
mention it; and that they evidently never once touch upon those heads of
the doctrine, which are now in great repute and particularly urged in the
preceding scheme of Predestination, and which I have already adduced. Nor
does any single Confession deliver this doctrine in the same manner as it
has just now been propounded by me. The Confessions of Bohemia, England
and Wirtemburgh, and the first Helvetian [Swiss] Confession, and that of
the four cities of Strasburgh, Constance, Memmingen, and Lindau, make no
mention of this Predestination. Those of Basle and Saxony, only take a very
cursory notice of it in three words. The Augustan Confession speaks of it
in such a manner as to induce the Genevan editors to think, that some annotation
was necessary on their part, to give us a previous warning. The last of
the Helvetian [Swiss] Confessions, to which a great portion of the Reformed
Churches have expressed their assent and which they have subscribed, likewise
speaks of it in such a strain as makes me very desirous to see what method
can possibly be adopted to give it any accordance with that doctrine of
Predestination which I have just now advanced. Yet this [Swiss] Confession
is that which has obtained the approbation of the Churches of Geneva and
Savoy.
VI. Without the least contention or caviling, it may very properly be made
a question of doubt, whether this doctrine agrees with the Belgic Confession
and the Heidelberg Catechism; as I shall briefly demonstrate.
1. In the 14th Article of the Dutch Confession, these expression soccur:
"Man knowingly and willingly subjected himself to sin, and, consequently,
to death and cursing, while he lent an ear to the deceiving words and impostures
of the devil," &c. From this sentence I conclude, that man did
not sin on account of any necessity through a preceding decree of Predestination:
which inference is diametrically opposed to that doctrine of Predestination
against which I now contend. Then, in the 16th Article, which treats of
the eternal election of God, these words are contained: "God shewed
himself Merciful, by delivering from damnation, and by saving, those persons
whom, in his eternal and immutable counsel and cording to his gratuitous
goodness, he chose in Christ Jesus our Lord, without any regard to their
works. And he shewed himself just, in leaving others in that their fall
and perdition into which they had precipitated themselves." It is not
obvious to me, how these words are consistent with this doctrine of Predestination.
2. In the 20th question of the Heidelberg Catechism, we read: "salvation
through Christ is not given [restored] to all them who had perished in Adam,
but to those only who are engrafted into Christ by the faith, and who embrace
his benefits." From this sentence I infer, that God has not absolutely
Predestinated any men to salvation; but that he has in his decree considered
[or looked upon] them as believers. This deduction is at open conflict with
the first and third points of this Predestination. In the 54th question
of the same Catechism, it is said: "I believe that, from the beginning
to the end of the world, the Son of God out of the entire race of mankind
doth by his word and Spirit gather or collect unto himself a company chosen
unto eternal life and agreeing together in the true faith." In this
sentence "election to eternal life," and "agreement in the
faith," stand in mutual juxtaposition; and in such a manner, that the
latter is not rendered subordinate to the former, which, according to these
sentiments on Predestination ought to have been done. In that case the words
should have been placed in the following order: "the son of God calls
and gathers to himself, by his word and Spirit, a company chosen to eternal
life, that they may believe and agree together in the true faith."
Since such are the statements of our Confession and Catechism, no reason
whatever exists, why those who embrace and defend these sentiments on Predestination,
should either violently endeavour to obtrude them on their colleagues and
on the Church of Christ; or why they should take it amiss, and put the worst
construction upon it, when any thing is taught in the Church or University
that is not exactly accordant with their doctrine, or that is opposed to
it.
VII. I affirm, that this doctrine is repugnant to the Nature of God, but
particularly to those Attributes of his nature by which he performs and
manages all things, his wisdom, justice, and goodness.
1. It is repugnant to his wisdom in three ways. (1.) Because it represents
God as decreeing something for a particular end [or purpose] which neither
is nor can be good: which is, that God created something for eternal perdition
to the praise of his justice. (2.) Because it states, that the object which
God proposed to himself by this Predestination, was, to demonstrate the
glory of his mercy and justice: But this glory he cannot demonstrate, except
by an act that is contrary at once to his mercy and his justice, of which
description is that decree of God in which he determined that man should
sin and be rendered miserable. (3.) Because it changes and inverts the order
of the two-fold wisdom of God, as it is displayed to us in the Scriptures.
For it asserts, that God has absolutely predetermined to save men by the
mercy and wisdom that are comprehended in the doctrine of the cross of Christ,
without having foreseen this circumstance, that it was impossible for man
(and that, truly, through his own fault,) to be saved by the wisdom which
was revealed in the law and which was infused into him at the period of
his creation: When the scripture asserts, on the contrary, that "it
pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe;"
that is, "by the doctrine of the cross, after that in the wisdom of
God the world by wisdom knew not God." (1 Cor. i, 21.)
2. It is repugnant to the justice of God, not only in reference to that
attribute denoting in God a love of righteousness and a hatred of iniquity,
but also in reference to its being a perpetual and constant desire in him
to render to every one that which is his due. (1.) It is at variance with
the first of these ideas of justice in the following manner: Because it
affirms, that God has absolutely willed to save certain individual men,
and has decreed their salvation without having the least regard to righteousness
or obedience: The proper inference from which, is, that God loves such men
far more than his own justice [or righteousness.] (2.) It is opposed to
the second idea of his justice: Because it affirms, that God wishes to subject
his creature to misery, (which cannot possibly have any existence except
as the punishment of sin,) although, at the same time, he does not look
upon [or consider] the creature as a sinner, and therefore as not obnoxious
either to wrath or to punishment. This is the manner in which it lays down
the position, that God has willed to give to the creature not only something
which does not belong to it, but which is connected with its greatest injury.
Which is another act directly opposed to his justice. In accordance, therefore,
with this doctrine, God, in the first place, detracts from himself that
which is his own, [or his right,] and then imparts to the creature what
does not belong to it, to its great misery and unhappiness.
3. It is also repugnant to the Goodness of God. Goodness is an affection
[or disposition] in God to communicate his own good so far as his justice
considers and admits to be fitting and proper. But in this doctrine the
following act is attributed to God, that, of himself, and induced to it
by nothing external, he wills the greatest evil to his creatures; and that
from all eternity he has pre-ordained that evil for them, or pre-determined
to impart it to them, even before he resolved to bestow upon them any portion
of good. For this doctrine states, that God willed to damn; and, that he
might be able to do this, be willed to create; although creation is the
first egress [or going forth] of God's goodness towards his creatures. How
vastly different are such statements as these from that expansive goodness
of God by which he confers benefits not only on the unworthy, but also on
the evil, the unjust and on those who are deserving of punishment, which
trait of Divine beneficence in our Father who is in heaven, we are commanded
to imitate. (Matt. v, 45.)
VIII. Such a doctrine of Predestination is contrary to the nature of man,
in regard to his having been created after the Divine image in the knowledge
of God and in righteousness, in regard to his having been created with freedom
of will, and in regard to his having been created with a disposition and
aptitude for the enjoyment of life eternal. These three circumstance, respecting
him, may be deduced from the following brief expressions: "Do this,
and live :" (Rom. x, 5) "In the day that thou eatest thereof,
thou shalt surely die." (Gen. ii, 17.) If man be deprived of any of
these qualifications, such admonitions as these cannot possibly be effective
in exciting him to obedience.
1. This doctrine is inconsistent with the Divine image, which consists of
the knowledge of God and holiness. For according to this knowledge and righteousness
man was qualified and empowered, he was also laid under an obligation to
know God, to love, worship, and serve him. But by the intervention, or rather
by the prevention, of this Predestination, it was pre- ordained that man
should be formed vicious and should commit sin, that is, that he should
neither know God, love, worship, nor serve him; and that he should not perform
that which by the image of God, he was well qualified and empowered to do,
and which he was bound to perform. This is tantamount to such a declaration
as the following, which any one might make: "God did undoubtedly create
man after his own image, in righteousness and true holiness; but, notwithstanding
this, he fore-ordained and decreed, that man should become impure and unrighteous,
that is, should be made conformable to the image of Satan."
2. This doctrine is inconsistent with the freedom of the will, in which
and with which man was created by God. For it prevents the exercise of this
liberty, by binding or determining the will absolutely to one object, that
is, to do this thing precisely, or to do that. God, therefore, according
to this statement, may be blamed for the one or the other of these two things,
(with which let no man charge his Maker!) either for creating man with freedom
of will, or for hindering him in the use of his own liberty after he had
formed him a free agent. In the former of these two cases, God is chargeable
with a want of consideration, in the latter with mutability. And in both,
with being injurious to man as well as to himself.
3. This Predestination is prejudicial to man in regard to the inclination
and capacity for the eternal fruition of salvation, with which he was endowed
at the period of his creation. For, since by this Predestination it has
been pre- determined, that the greater part of mankind shall not be made
partakers of salvation, but shall fall into everlasting condemnation, and
since this predetermination took place even before the decree had passed
for creating man, such persons are deprived of something, for the desire
of which they have been endowed by God with a natural inclination. This
great privation they suffer, not in consequence of any preceding sin or
demerit of their own, but simply and solely through this sort of Predestination.
IX. This Predestination is diametrically opposed to the Act of Creation.
1. For creation is a communication of good according to the intrinsic property
of its nature. But, creation of this description, whose intent or design
is, to make a way through itself by which the reprobation that had been
previously determined may obtain its object, is not a communication of good.
For we ought to form our estimate and judgment of every good, from the mind
and intention of Him who is the Donor, and from the end to which or on account
of which it is bestowed. In the present instance, the intention of the Donor
would have been, to condemn, which is an act that could not possibly affect
any one except a creature; and the end or event of creation would have been
the eternal perdition of the creature. In that case creation would not have
been a communication of any good, but a preparation for the greatest evil
both according to the very intention of the Creator and the actual issue
of the matter; and according to the words of Christ, "it had seen good
for that man, if he had never been born!" (Matt. xxvi, 24.)
2. Reprobation is an act of hatred, and from hatred derives its origin.
But creation does not proceed from hatred; it is not therefore a way or
means, which belongs to the execution of the decree of reprobation.
3. Creation is a perfect act of God, by which he has manifested his wisdom,
goodness and omnipotence: It is not therefore subordinate to the end of
any other preceding work or action of God. But it is rather to be viewed
as that act of God, which necessarily precedes and is antecedent to all
other acts that he can possibly either decree or undertake. Unless God had
formed a previous conception of the work of creation, he could not have
decreed actually to undertake any other act; and until he had executed the
work of creation, he could by no means have completed any other operation.
4. All the actions of God which tend to the condemnation of his creatures,
are strange work or foreign to him; because God consents to them, for some
other cause that is quite extraneous. But creation is not an action that
is foreign to God, but it is proper to him. It is eminently an action most
appropriate to Him, and to which he could be moved by no other external
cause, because it is the very first of the Divine acts, and, till it was
done, nothing could have any actual existence, except God himself; for every
thing else that has a being, came into existence through this action.
5. If creation be the way and means through which God willed the execution
of the decree of his reprobation, he was more inclined to will the act of
reprobation than that of creation; and he consequently derived greater satisfaction
from the act of condemning certain of his innocent creatures, than in the
act of their creation.
6. Lastly. Creation cannot be a way or means of reprobation according to
the absolute purpose of God: because, after the creation was completed,
it was in the power of man still to have remained obedient to the divine
commands, and not to commit sin; to render this possible, while God had
on one part bestowed on him sufficient strength and power, he had also on
the other placed sufficient impediments; a circumstance most diametrically
opposed to a Predestination of this description.
X. This doctrine is at open hostility with the Nature of Eternal Life, and
the titles by which it is signally distinguished in the Scriptures. For
it is called "the inheritance of the sons of God ;" (Tit. iii,
7,) but those alone are the sons of God, according to the doctrine of the
Gospel, "who believe in the name of Jesus Christ." (John i, 12.)
It is also called, "the reward of obedience," (Matt. v, 12,) and
of "the labour of love;" (Heb. vi, 10,) "the recompense of
those who fight the good fight and who run well, a crown of righteousness,"
&c. (Rev. ii, 10; 2 Tim. iv, 7, 8.) God therefore has not, from his
own absolute decree, without any consideration or regard whatever to faith
and obedience, appointed to any man, or determined to appoint to him, life
eternal.
XI This Predestination is also opposed to the Nature of Eternal Death, and
to those appellations by which it is described in Scripture. For it is called
"the wages of sin; (Rom. vi, 23,) the punishment of everlasting destruction,
which shall be recompensed to them that know not God, and that obey not
the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; (2 Thess. i, 8, 9,) the everlasting
fire prepared for the devil and his angels, (Matt. xxv, 41,) a fire which
shall devour the enemies and adversaries of God." (Heb. x, 27.) God,
therefore, has not, by any absolute decree without respect to sin and disobedience,
prepared eternal death for any person.
XII This Predestination is inconsistent with the Nature and Properties of
Sin in two ways: (1.) Because sin is called "disobedience" and
"rebellion," neither of which terms can possibly apply to any
person who by a preceding divine decree is placed under an unavoidable necessity
of sinning. (2.) Because sin is the meritorious cause of damnation. But
the meritorious cause which moves the Divine will to reprobate, is according
to justice; and it induces God, who holds sin in abhorrence, to will reprobation.
Sin, therefore, which is a cause, cannot be placed among the means, by which
God executes the decree or will of reprobation.
XIII. This doctrine is likewise repugnant to the Nature of Divine Grace,
and as far as its powers permit, it effects its destruction. Under whatever
specious pretenses it may be asserted, that "this kind of Predestination
is most admirably adapted and quite necessary for the establishment of grace,"
yet it destroys it in three ways:
1. Because grace is so attempered and commingled with the nature of man,
as not to destroy within him the liberty of his will, but to give it a right
direction, to correct its depravity, and to allow man to possess his own
proper notions. While, on the contrary, this Predestination introduces such
a species of grace, as takes away free will and hinders its exercise.
2. Because the representations of grace which the scriptures contain, are
such as describe it capable of "being resisted, (Acts, vii, 51,) and
received in vain;" (2 Cor. vi, 1,) and that it is possible for man
to avoid yielding his assent to it; and to refuse all co-operation with
it. (Heb. xii, 15; Matt. xxiii, 37; Luke vii, 30.) While, on the contrary,
this Predestination affirms, that grace is a certain irresistible force
and operation.
3. Because, according to the primary intention and chief design of God,
grace conduces to the good of those persons to whom it is offered and by
whom it is received: while, on the contrary, this doctrine drags along with
it the assertion, that grace is offered even to certain reprobates, and
is so far communicated to them as to illuminate their understandings and
to excite within them a taste for the heavenly gifts, only for this end
and purpose, that, in proportion to the height to which they are elevated,
the abyss into which they are precipitated may be the deeper, and their
fall the heavier; and that they may both merit and receive the greater perdition.
XIV. The doctrine of this Predestination is Injurious to the Glory of God,
which does not consist of a declaration of liberty or authority, nor of
a demonstration of anger and power, except to such an extent as that declaration
and demonstration may be consistent with justice, and with a perpetual reservation
in behalf of the honour of God's goodness. But, according to this doctrine,
it follows that God is the author of sin, which may be proved by four arguments:
1. One of its positions is, that God has absolutely decreed to demonstrate
his glory by punitive justice and mercy, in the salvation of some men, and
in the damnation of others, which neither was done, nor could have possibly
been done, unless sin had entered into the world.
2. This doctrine affirms, that, in order to obtain his object, God ordained
that man should commit sin, and be rendered vitiated; and, from this Divine
ordination or appointment, the fall of man necessarily followed.
3. It asserts that God has denied to man, or has withdrawn from him, such
a portion of grace as is sufficient and necessary to enable him to avoid
sin, and that this was done before man had sinned: which is an act that
amounts to the same as if God had prescribed a law to man, which it would
be utterly impossible for him to fulfill, when the nature in which he had
been created was taken into consideration.
4nd internal, both mediate (by means of the intervention of other c. It
ascribes to God certain operations with regard to man, both external areatures)
and immediate -- which Divine operations being once admitted, man must necessarily
commit sin, by that necessity which the schoolmen call "a consequential
necessity antecedent to the thing itself," and which totally destroys
the freedom of the will. Such an act does this doctrine attribute to God,
and represents it to proceed from his primary and chief intention, without
any foreknowledge of an inclination, will, or action on the part of man.
From these premises, we deduce, as a further conclusion, that God really
sins. Because, according to this doctrine, he moves to sin by an act that
is unavoidable, and according to his own purpose and primary intention,
without having received any previous inducement to such an act from any
preceding sin or demerit in man.
From the same position we might also infer, that God is the only sinner.
For man, who is impelled by an irresistible force to commit sin, (that is,
to perpetrate some deed that has been prohibited,) cannot be said to sin
himself.
As a legitimate consequence it also follows, that sin is not sin, since
whatever that be which God does, it neither can be sin, nor ought any of
his acts to receive that appellation.
Besides the instances which I have already recounted, there is another method
by which this doctrine inflicts a deep wound on the honour of God -- but
these, it is probable, will be considered at present to be amply sufficient.
XV. This doctrine is highly dishonourable to Jesus Christ our saviour. For,
1. It entirely excludes him from that decree of Predestination which predestinates
the end: and it affirms, that men were predestinated to be saved, before
Christ was predestinated to save them; and thus it argues, that he is not
the foundation of election. 2. It denies, that Christ is the meritorious
cause, that again obtained for us the salvation which we had lost, by placing
him as only a subordinate cause of that salvation which had been already
foreordained, and thus only a minister and instrument to apply that salvation
unto us. This indeed is in evident congruity with the opinion which states
"that God has absolutely willed the salvation of certain men, by the
first and supreme decree which he passed, and on which all his other decrees
depend and are consequent." If this be true, it was therefore impossible
for the salvation of such men to have been lost, and therefore unnecessary
for it to be repaired and in some sort regained afresh, and discovered,
by the merit of Christ, who was fore-ordained a saviour for them alone.
XVI. This doctrine is also hurtful to the salvation of men.
1. Because it prevents that saving and godly sorrow for sins that have been
committed, which cannot exist in those who have no consciousness of sin.
But it is obvious, that the man who has committed sin through the unavoidable
necessity of the decree of God, cannot possibly have this kind of consciousness
of sin. (2 Cor. vii, 10.)
2. Because it removes all pious solicitude about being converted from sin
unto God. For he can feel no such concern who is entirely passive and conducts
himself like a dead man, with respect not only to his discernment and perception
of the grace of God that is exciting and assisting, but also to his assent
and obedience to it; and who is converted by such an irresistible impulse,
that he not only cannot avoid being sensible of the grace of God which knocks
within him, but he must likewise of necessity yield his assent to it, and
thus convert himself, or rather be converted. Such a person it is evident,
cannot produce within his heart or conceive in his mind this solicitude,
except he have previously felt the same irresistible motion. And if he should
produce within his heart any such concern, it would be in vain and without
the least advantage. For that cannot be a true solicitude, which is not
produced in the heart by any other means except by an irresistible force
according to the absolute purpose and intention of God to effect his salvation.
(Rev. ii, 3; iii, 2.)
3. Because it restrains, in persons that are converted, all zeal and studious
regard for good works, since it declares "that the regenerate cannot
perform either more or less good than they do." For he that is actuated
or impelled by saving grace, must work, and cannot discontinue his labour;
but he that is not actuated by the same grace, can do nothing, and finds
it necessary to cease from all attempts. (Tit. iii, 14.)
4. Because it extinguishes the zeal for prayer, which yet is an efficacious
means instituted by God for asking and obtaining all kinds of blessings
from him, but principally the great one of salvation. (Luke xi, 1-13.) But
from the circumstance of it having been before determined by an immutable
and inevitable decree, that this description of men [the elect] should obtain
salvation, prayer cannot on any account be a means for asking and obtaining
that salvation. It can only be a mode of worshipping God; because according
to the absolute decree of his Predestination he has determined that such
men shall be saved.
5. It takes away all that most salutary fear and trembling with which we
are commanded to work out our own salvation. (Phil. ii, 12) for it states
"that he who is elected and believes, cannot sin with that full and
entire willingness with which sin is committed by the ungodly; and that
they cannot either totally or finally fall away from faith or grace."
6. Because it produces within men a despair both of performing that which
their duty requires and of obtaining that towards which their desires are
directed. For when they are taught that the grace of God (which is really
necessary to the performance of the least portion of good) is denied to
the majority of mankind, according to an absolute and peremptory decree
of God -- - and that such grace is denied because, by a preceding decree
equally absolute, God has determined not to confer salvation on them but
damnation; when they are thus taught, it is scarcely possible for any other
result to ensue, than that the individual who cannot even with great difficulty
work a persuasion within himself of his being elected, should soon consider
himself included in the number of the reprobate. From such an apprehension
as this, must arise a certain despair of performing
righteousness and obtaining salvation.
XVII. This doctrine inverts the order of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. For
in the Gospel God requires repentance and faith on the part of man, by promising
to him life everlasting, if he consent to become a convert and a believer.
(Mark i, 15; xvi, 16.) But it is stated in this [Supralapsarian] decree
of Predestination, that it is God's absolute will, to bestow salvation on
certain particular men, and that he willed at the same time absolutely to
give those very individuals repentance and faith, by means of an irresistible
force, because it was his will and pleasure to save them. In the Gospel,
God denounces eternal death on the impenitent and unbelieving. (John iii,
36.) And those threats contribute to the purpose which he has in view, that
he may by such means deter them from unbelief and thus may save them. But
by this decree of Predestination it is taught, that God wills not to confer
on certain individual men that grace which is necessary for conversion and
faith because he has absolutely decreed their condemnation.
The Gospel says, "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten
son, that whosoever believeth in him should have everlasting life."
(John iii, 16.)
But this doctrine declares; "that God so loved those whom he had absolutely
elected to eternal life, as to give his son to them alone, and by an irresistible
force to produce within them faith on him." To embrace the whole in
few words, the Gospel says, "fulfill the command, and thou shalt obtain
the promise; believe, and thou shalt live." But this [supralapsarian]
doctrine says, "since it is my will to give thee life, it is therefore
my will to give thee faith:" which is a real and most manifest inversion
of the Gospel.
XVIII. This Predestination is in open hostility to the ministry of the Gospel.
1. For if God by an irresistible power quicken him who is dead in trespasses
and sins, no man can be a minister and "a labourer together with God,"
(1 Cor. iii, 9,) nor can the word preached by man be the instrument of grace
and of the Spirit, any more than a creature could have been an instrument
of grace in the first creation, or a dispenser of that grace in the resurrection
of the body from the dead.
2. Because by this Predestination the ministry of the gospel is made "the
savour of death unto death" in the case of the majority of those who
hear it, (2 Cor. ii, 14-16,) as well as an instrument of condemnation, according
to the primary design and absolute intention of God, without any consideration
of previous rebellion.
3. Because, according to this doctrine, baptism, when administered to many
reprobate children, (who yet are the offspring of parents that believe and
are God's covenant people,) is evidently a seal [or ratification] of nothing,
and thus becomes entirely useless, in accordance with the primary and absolute
intention of God, without any fault [or culpability] on the part of the
infants themselves, to whom it is administered in obedience to the Divine
command.
4. Because it hinders public prayers from being offered to God in a becoming
and suitable manner, that is, with faith, and in confidence that they will
be profitable to all the hearers of the word; when there are many among
them, whom God is not only unwilling to save, but whom by his absolute,
eternal, and immutable will, (which is antecedent to all things and causes
whatever,) it is his will and pleasure to damn: In the mean time, when the
apostle commands prayers and supplications to be made for all men, he adds
this reason, "for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our
saviour; who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge
of the truth." (1 Tim. ii, 1-4.)
5. The constitution of this doctrine is such, as very easily to render pastors
and teachers slothful and negligent in the exercise of their ministry: Because,
from this doctrine it appears to them as though it were impossible for all
their diligence to be useful to any persons, except to those only whom God
absolutely and precisely wills to save, and who cannot possibly perish;
and as though all their negligence could be hurtful to none, except to those
alone whom God absolutely wills to destroy, who must of necessity perish,
and to whom a contrary fate is impossible.
XIX. This doctrine completely subverts the foundation of religion in general,
and of the Christian Religion in particular.
1. The foundation of religion considered in general, is a two-fold love
of God; without which there neither is nor can be any religion: The first
of them is a love for righteousness [or justice] which gives existence to
his hatred of sin. The second is a love for the creature who is endowed
with reason, and (in the matter now before us,) it is a love for man, according
to the expression of the Apostle to the Hebrews. "for he that cometh
to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently
seek Him." (xi, 6.) God's love of righteousness is manifested by this
circumstance, that it is not his will and pleasure to bestow eternal life
on any except on "those who seek him." God's love of man consists
in his being willing to give him eternal life, if he seek Him.
A mutual relation subsists between these two kinds of love, which is this.
The latter species of love, which extends itself to the creatures, cannot
come into exercise, except so far as it is permitted by the former, [the
love of righteousness]: The former love, therefore, is by far the most excellent
species; but in every direction there is abundant scope for the emanations
of the latter, [the love of the creature,] except where the former [the
love of righteousness] has placed some impediment in the range of its exercise.
The first of these consequences is most evidently proved from the circumstance
of God's condemning man on account of sin, although he loves him in the
relation in which he stands as his creature; which would by no means have
been done, had he loved man more than righteousness, [or justice,] and had
he evinced a stronger aversion to the eternal misery of man than to his
disobedience. But the second consequence is proved by this argument, that
God condemns no person, except on account of sin; and that he saves such
a multitude of men who turn themselves away [or are converted] from sin;
which he could not do, unless it was his will to allow as abundant scope
to his love for the creatures, as is permitted by righteousness [or justice]
under the regulation of the Divine judgment.
But this [Supralapsarian] doctrine inverts this order and mutual relation
in two ways: (1.) The one is when it states, that God wills absolutely to
save certain particular men, without having had in that his intention the
least reference or regard to their obedience. This is the manner in which
it places the love of God to man before his love of righteousness, and lays
down the position -- that God loves men (as such) more than righteousness,
and evinces a stronger aversion to their misery than to their sin and disobedience.
(2.) The other is when it asserts, on the contrary, that God wills absolutely
to damn certain particular men without manifesting in his decree any consideration
of their disobedience. In this manner it detracts from his love to the creature
that which belongs to it; while it teaches, that God hates the creature,
without any cause or necessity derived from his love of righteousness and
his hatred of iniquity. In which case, it is not true, "that sin is
the primary object of God's hatred, and its only meritorious cause."
The great influence and potency which this consideration possesses in subverting
the foundation of religion, may be appropriately described by the following
simile: Suppose a son to say, "My father is such a great lover of righteousness
and equity, that, notwithstanding I am his beloved son, he would disinherit
me if I were found disobedient to him. Obedience, therefore, is a duty which
I must sedulously cultivate, and which is highly incumbent upon me, if I
wish to be his heir." Suppose another son to say: "My father's
love for me is so great, that he is absolutely resolved to make me his heir.
There is, therefore, no necessity for my earnestly striving to yield him
obedience; for, according to his unchangeable will, I shall become his heir.
Nay, he will by an irresistible force draw me to obey him, rather than not
suffer me to be made his heir." But such reasoning as the latter is
diametrically opposed to the doctrine contained in the following words of
John the Baptist: "And think not to say within yourselves, we have
Abraham to our father: For I say unto you, that God is able of these stones
to raise up children unto Abraham." (Matt. iii, 9.)
2. But the Christian religion also has its superstructure built upon this
two-fold love as a foundation. This love, however, is to be considered in
a manner somewhat different, in consequence of the change in the condition
of man, who, when he had been created after the image of God and in his
favour, became by his own fault a sinner and an enemy to God. (1.) God's
love of righteousness [or justice] on which the Christian religion rests,
is, first, that righteousness which he declared only once, which was in
Christ; because it was his will that sin should not be expiated in any other
way than by the blood and death of his Son, and that Christ should not be
admitted before him as an Advocate, Deprecator and Intercessor, except when
sprinkled by his own blood. But this love of righteousness is, secondly,
that which he daily manifests in the preaching of the gospel, in which he
declares it to be his will to grant a communication of Christ and his benefits
to no man, except to him who becomes converted and believes in Christ. (2.)
God's love of miserable sinners, on which likewise the Christian religion
is founded, is, first, that love by which he gave his Son for them, and
constituted him a saviour of those who obey him. But this love of sinners
is, secondly, that by which he hath required obedience, not according to
the rigor and severity to which he was entitled by his own supreme right,
but according to his grace and clemency, and with the addition of a promise
of the remission of sins, provided fallen man repent.
The [supralapsarian] doctrine of Predestination is, in two ways, opposed
to this two-fold foundation: first, by stating, "that God has such
a great love for certain sinners, that it was his will absolutely to save
them before he had given satisfaction, through Christ Jesus, to his love
of righteousness, [or justice,] and that he thus willed their salvation
even in his own fore-knowledge and according to his determinate purpose."
Besides, it totally and most completely overturns this foundation, by teaching
it to be "God's pleasure, that satisfaction should be paid to his justice,
[or righteousness,] because he willed absolutely to save such persons:"
which is nothing less, than to make his love for justice, manifested in
Christ, subordinate to his love for sinful man whom it is his will absolutely
to save. Secondly. It opposes itself to this foundation, by teaching, "that
it is the will of God absolutely to damn certain sinners without any consideration
of their impenitency;" when at the same time a most plenary and complete
satisfaction had been rendered, in Christ Jesus, to God's love of righteousness
[or justice] and to his hatred of sin. So that nothing now can hinder the
possibility of his extending mercy to the sinner, whosoever he may be, except
the condition of repentance. Unless some person should choose to assert,
what is stated in this doctrine, "that it has been God's will to act
towards the greater part of mankind with the same severity as he exercised
towards the devil and his angels, or even with greater, since it was his
pleasure that neither Christ nor his gospel should be productive of greater
blessings to them than to the devils, and since, according to the first
offense, the door of grace is as much closed against them as it is against
the evil angels." Yet each of those angels sinned, by himself in his
own proper person, through his individual maliciousness, and by his voluntary
act; while men sinned, only in Adam their parent, before they had been brought
into existence.
But, that we may more clearly understand the fact of this two-fold love
being the foundation of all religion and the manner in which it is so, with
the mutual correspondence that subsists between each other, as we have already
described them, it will be profitable for us to contemplate with greater
attention the following words of the Apostle to the Hebrews: "He that
cometh to God, must believe that He is and that He is a rewarder of them
that diligently seek Him." In these words two things are laid down
as foundations to religion, in opposition to two fiery darts of Satan, which
are the most pernicious pests to it, and each of which is able by itself
to overturn and extirpate all religion. One of them is security, the other
despair. Security operates, when a man permits himself, that, how inattentive
soever he may be to the worship of God, he will not be damned, but will
obtain salvation. Despair is in operation, when a person entertains a persuasion,
that, whatever degree of reverence he may evince towards God, he will not
receive any remuneration. In what human mind soever either of these pests
is fostered, it is impossible that any true and proper worship of God can
there reside. Now both of them are overturned by the words of the Apostle:
For if a man firmly believes, "that God will bestow eternal life on
those alone who seek Him, but that He will inflict on the rest death eternal,"
he can on no account indulge himself in security. And if he likewise believes,
that "God is truly a rewarder of those who diligently seek Him,"
by applying himself to the search he will not be in danger of falling into
despair. The foundation of the former kind of faith by which a man firmly
believes, "that God will bestow eternal life on none except on those
who seek Him," is that love which God bears to his own righteousness,
[or justice,] and which is greater than that which he entertains for man.
And, by this alone, all cause of security is removed. But the foundation
of the latter kind of faith, "that God will undoubtedly be a rewarder
of those who diligently seek Him," is that great love for man which
neither will nor can prevent God from effecting salvation for him, except
he be hindered by his still greater love for righteousness or justice. Yet
the latter kind of love is so far from operating as a hindrance to God from
becoming a rewarder of those who diligently seek Him, that on the contrary,
it promotes in every possible way the bestowment of that reward. Those persons,
therefore, who seek God, can by no means indulge in a single doubt concerning
his readiness to remunerate. And it is this which acts as a preservative
against despair or distrust. Since this is the actual state of the case,
this two-fold love, and the mutual relation which each part of it bears
to the other and which we have just unfolded, are the foundations of religion,
without which no religion can possibly exist. That doctrine, therefore,
which is in open hostility to this mutual love and to the relation that
mutually subsists between them, is, at the same time, subversive of the
foundation of all religion.
XX. Lastly. This doctrine of Predestination has been rejected both in former
times and in our own days, by the greater part of the professors of Christianity.
1. But, omitting all mention of the periods that occurred in former ages,
facts themselves declare, that the Lutheran and Anabaptist Churches, as
well as that of Rome, account this to be an erroneous doctrine.
2. However highly Luther and Melancthon might at the very commencement of
the reformation, have approved of this doctrine, they afterwards deserted
it. This change in Melancthon is quite apparent from his latter writings:
And those who style themselves "Luther's disciples," make the
same statement respecting their master, while they contend that on this
subject he made a more distinct and copious declaration of his sentiments,
instead of entirely abandoning those which he formerly entertained. But
Philip Melancthon believed that this doctrine did not differ greatly from
the fate of the Stoics: This appears from many of his writings, but more
particularly in a certain letter which he addressed to Gasper Peucer, and
in which, among other things, he states: "Lælius writes to me
and says, that the controversy respecting the Stoical Fate is agitated with
such uncommon fervour at Geneva, that one individual is cast into prison
because he happened to differ from Zeno. O unhappy times! When the doctrine
of salvation is thus obscured by certain strange disputes!"
3. All the Danish Churches embrace a doctrine quite opposed to this, as
is obvious from the writings of Nicholas Hemmingius in his treatise on Universal
Grace, in which he declares that the contest between him and his adversaries
consisted in the determination of these two points: "do the Elect believe
," or, "are believers the true elect?" He considers "those
persons who maintain the former position, to hold sentiments agreeable to
the doctrine of the Manichees and Stoics; and those who maintain the latter
point, are in obvious agreement with Moses and the Prophets, with Christ
and his Apostles."
4. Besides, by many of the inhabitants of these our own provinces, this
doctrine is accounted a grievance of such a nature, as to cause several
of them to affirm, that on account of it, they neither can nor will have
any communion with our Church. Others of them have united themselves with
our Churches, but not without entering a protest, "that they cannot
possibly give their consent to this doctrine." But, on account of this
kind of Predestination, our Churches have been deserted by not a few individuals,
who formerly held the same opinions as ourselves: Others, also, have threatened
to depart from us, unless they be fully assured that the Church holds no
opinion of this description.
5. There is likewise no point of doctrine which the Papists, Anabaptists,
and Lutherans oppose with greater vehemence than this, and through whose
sides they create a worse opinion of our Churches or procure for them a
greater portion of hatred, and thus bring into disrepute all the doctrines
which we profess. They likewise affirm "that of all the blasphemies
against God which the mind of man can conceive or his tongue can express,
there is none so foul as not to be deduced by fair consequence from this
opinion of our doctors."
6. Lastly. Of all the difficulties and controversies which have arisen in
these our Churches since the time of the Reformation, there is none that
has not had its origin in this doctrine, or that has not, at least, been
mixed with it. What I have here said will be found true, if we bring to
our recollection the controversies which existed at Leyden in the affair
of Koolhaes, at Gouda in that of Herman Herberts, at Horn with respect to
Cornelius Wiggerston, and at Mendenblich in the affair of Tako Sybrants.
This consideration was not among the last of those motives which induced
me to give my most diligent attention to this head of doctrine, and endeavour
to prevent our Churches from suffering any detriment from it; because, from
it, the Papists have derived much of their increase. While all pious teachers
ought most heartily to desire the destruction of Popery, as they would that
of the kingdom of Antichrist, they ought with the greatest zeal, to engage
in the attempt, and as far as it is within their power, to make the most
efficient preparations for its overthrow.
The preceding views are, in brief, those which I hold respecting this novel
doctrine of Predestination. I have propounded it with all good faith from
the very expressions of the authors themselves, that I might not seem to
invent and attribute to them any thing which I was not able clearly to prove
from their writings.
2. A SECOND KIND OF PREDESTINATION.
But some other of our doctors state the subject of God's Predestination
in a manner somewhat different. We will cursorily touch upon the two modes
which they employ. Among some of them the following opinion is prevalent:
1. God determined within himself, by an eternal and immutable decree, to
make (according to his own good pleasure,) the smaller portion out of the
general mass of mankind partakers of his grace and glory, to the praise
of his own glorious grace. But according to his pleasure he also passed
by the greater portion of men, and left them in their own nature, which
is incapable of every thing supernatural, [or beyond itself,] and did not
communicate to them that saving and supernatural grace by which their nature,
(if it still retained its integrity,) might be strengthened, or by which,
if it were corrupted, it might be restored -- for a demonstration of his
own liberty. Yet after God had made these men sinners and guilty of death,
he punished them with death eternal -- for a demonstration of his own justice.
2. Predestination is to be considered in respect to its end and to the means
which tend to it. But these persons employ the word "Predestination"
in its special acceptation for election and oppose it to reprobation. (1.)
In respect to its end, (which is salvation, and an illustration of the glorious
grace of God,) man is considered in common and absolutely, such as he is
in his own nature. (2.) But in respect to the means, man is considered as
perishing from himself and in himself, and as guilty in Adam.
3. In the decree concerning the end, the following gradations are to be
regarded. (1.) The prescience of God, by which he foreknew those whom he
had predestinated. Then (2.) The Divine prefinition, [or predetermination,]
by which he foreordained the salvation of those persons by whom he had foreknown.
First, by electing them from all eternity: and secondly, by preparing for
them grace in this life, and glory in the world to come.
4. The means which belong to the execution of this Predestination, are (1.)
Christ himself: (2.) An efficacious call to faith in Christ, from which
justification takes its origin: (3.) The gift of perseverance unto the end.
5. As far as we are capable of comprehending their scheme of reprobation
it consists of two acts, that of preterition and that of predamnatian. It
is antecedent to all things, and to all causes which are either in the things
themselves or which arise out of them; that is, it has no regard whatever
to any sin, and only views man in an absolute and general aspect.
6. Two means are fore-ordained for the execution of the act of preterition:
(1.) Dereliction [or abandoning] in a state of nature, which by itself is
incapable of every thing supernatural: and (2.) Non-communication [or a
negation] of supernatural grace, by which their nature (if in a state of
integrity,) might be strengthened, and (if in a state of corruption,) might
be restored.
7. Predamnation is antecedent to all things, yet it does by no means exist
without a fore-knowledge of the causes of damnation. It views man as a sinner,
obnoxious to damnation in Adam, and as on this account perishing through
the necessity of Divine justice.
8. The means ordained for the execution of this predamnation, are (1.) Just
desertion, which is either that of exploration, [or examination,] in which
God does not confer his grace, or that of punishment when God takes away
from a man all his saving gifts, and delivers him over to the power of Satan.
(2.) The second means are induration or hardening, and those consequences
which usually follow even to the real damnation of the person reprobated.
3. A THIRD KIND OF PREDESTINATION.
But others among our doctors state their sentiments on this subject in the
following manner:
1. Because God willed within himself from all eternity to make a decree
by which he might elect certain men and reprobate the rest, he viewed and
considered the human race not only as created but likewise as fallen or
corrupt, and on that account obnoxious to cursing and malediction. Out of
this lapsed and accursed state God determined to liberate certain individuals
and freely to save them by his grace, for a declaration of his mercy; but
he resolved in his own just judgment to leave the rest under the curse [or
malediction] for a declaration of his justice. In both these cases God acts
without the least consideration of repentance and faith in those whom he
elects, or of impenitence and unbelief in those whom he reprobates.
2. The special means which relate particularly to the execution both of
election and reprobation, are the very same as those which we have already
expounded in the first of these kinds of Predestination, with the exception
of those means which are common both to election and reprobation; because
this [third] opinion places the fall of man, not as a means fore-ordained
for the execution of the preceding decree of Predestination, but as something
that might furnish a fixed purpose or occasion for making this decree of
Predestination.
4. MY JUDGMENT RESPECTING THE TWO LAST DESCRIBED SCHEMES OF PREDESTINATION.
Both these opinions, as they outwardly pretend, differ from the first in
this point -- that neither of them lays down the creation or the fall as
a mediate cause fore-ordained by God for the execution of the preceding
decree of Predestination. Yet, with regard to the fall, some diversity may
be perceived in the two latter opinions. For the second kind of Predestination
places election, with regard to the end, before the fall; it also places
before that event preterition, [or passing by,] which is the first part
of reprobation. While the third kind does not allow any part of election
and reprobation to commence till after the fall of man. But, among the causes
which seem to have induced the inventors of the two latter schemes to deliver
the doctrine of Predestination in this manner, and not to ascend to such
a great height as the inventors of the first scheme have done, this is not
the least -- that they have been desirous of using the greatest precaution,
lest it might be concluded from their doctrine that God is the author of
sin, with as much show of probability as, (according to the intimation of
some of those who yield their assent to both the latter kinds,) it is deducible
from the first description of Predestination.
Yet if we be willing to inspect these two latter opinions a little more
closely, and in particular if we accurately examine the second and third
kind and compare them with other sentiments of the same author concerning
some subjects of our religion, we shall discover, that the fall of Adam
cannot possibly, according to their views, be considered in any other manner
than as a necessary means for the execution of the preceding decree of Predestination.
1. In reference to the second of the three, this is apparent from two reasons
comprised in it:
The first of these reasons is that which states God to have determined by
the decree of reprobation to deny to man that grace which was necessary
for the confirmation and strengthening of his nature, that it might not
be corrupted by sin; which amounts to this, that God decreed not to bestow
that grace which was necessary to avoid sin; and from this must necessarily
follow the transgression of man, as proceeding from a law imposed on him.
The fall of man is therefore a means ordained for the execution of the decree
of reprobation.
The second of these reasons is that which states the two parts of reprobation
to be preterition and predamnation. These two parts, according to that decree,
are connected together by a necessary and mutual bond, and are equally extensive.
For, all those whom God passed by in conferring Divine grace, are likewise
damned. Indeed no others are damned, except those who are the subjects of
this act of preterition. From this therefore it may be concluded, that "sin
must necessarily follow from the decree of reprobation or preterition, because,
if it were otherwise, it might possibly happen, that a person who had been
passed by, might not commit sin, and from that circumstance might not become
liable to damnation; since sin is the sole meritorious cause of damnation:
and thus certain of those individuals who had been passed by, might neither
be saved nor damned -- which is great absurdity.
This
second opinion on Predestination, therefore, falls into the same inconvenience
as the first. For it not only does not avoid that [conclusion of making
God the author of sin,] but while those who profess it make the attempt,
they fall into a palpable and absurd self-contradiction -- while, in reference
to this point, the first of these opinions is alike throughout and consistent
with itself.
2. The third of these schemes of Predestination would escape this rock to
much better effect, did not the patrons of it, while declaring their sentiments
on Predestination and providence, employ certain expressions, from which
the necessity of the fall might be deduced. Yet this necessity cannot possibly
have any other origin than some degree of Predestination.
(1.)
One of these explanatory expressions is their description of the Divine
permission, by which God permits sin. Some of them describe it thus: "permission
is the withdrawing of that Divine grace, by which, when God executes the
decrees of his will through rational creatures, he either does not reveal
to the creature that divine will of his own by which he wills that action
to be performed, or does not bend the will of the creature to yield obedience
in that act to the Divine will." To these expressions, the following
are immediately subjoined: "if this be a correct statement, the creature
commits sin through necessity, yet voluntarily and without restraint."
If it be objected that "this description does not comport with that
permission by which God permitted the sin of Adam:" We also entertain
the same opinion about it. Yet it follows, as a consequence, from this very
description, that "other sins are committed through necessity."
(2.) Of a similar tendency are the expressions which some of them use, when
they contend, that the declaration of the glory of God, which must necessarily
be illustrated, is placed in "the demonstration of mercy and of punitive
justice." But such a demonstration could not have been made, unless
sin, and misery through sin, had entered into the world, to form at least
some degree of misery for the least sin. And in this manner is sin also
necessarily introduced, through the necessity of such a demonstration of
the Divine glory. Since the fall of Adam is already laid down to be necessary,
and, on that account, to be a means for executing the preceding decree of
Predestination; creation itself is likewise at the same time laid down as
a means subservient to the execution of the same decree. For the fall cannot
be necessarily consequent upon the creation, except through the decree of
Predestination, which cannot be placed between the creation and the fall,
but is prefixed to both of them, as having the precedence, and ordaining
creation for the fall, and both of them for executing one and the same decree
-- to demonstrate the justice of God in the punishment of sin, and his mercy
in its remission. Because, if this were not the case, that which must necessarily
ensue from the act of creation had not seen intended by God when he created,
which is to suppose an impossibility.
But let
it be granted, that the necessity of the fall of Adam cannot be deduced
from either of the two latter opinions, yet all the preceding arguments
which have been produced against the first opinion, are, after a trifling
modification to suit the varied purpose, equally valid against the two latter.
This would be very apparent, if, to demonstrate it, a conference were to
be instituted.
5. MY OWN SENTIMENTS ON PREDESTINATION.
I have hitherto been stating those opinions concerning the article of Predestination
which are inculcated in our Churches and in the University of Leyden, and
of which I disapprove. I have at the same time produced my own reasons,
why I form such an unfavourable judgment concerning them; and I will now
declare my own opinions on this subject, which are of such a description
as, according to my views, appear most conformable to the word of God.
I.
The first absolute decree of God concerning the salvation of sinful man,
is that by which he decreed to appoint his Son, Jesus Christ, for a Mediator,
Redeemer, saviour, Priest and King, who might destroy sin by his own death,
might by his obedience obtain the salvation which had been lost, and might
communicate it by his own virtue.
II. The second precise and absolute decree of God, is that in which he decreed
to receive into favour those who repent and believe, and, in Christ, for
his sake and through Him, to effect the salvation of such penitents and
believers as persevered to the end; but to leave in sin, and under wrath,
all impenitent persons and unbelievers, and to damn them as aliens from
Christ.
III. The third Divine decree is that by which God decreed to administer
in a sufficient and efficacious manner the means which were necessary for
repentance and faith; and to have such administration instituted (1.) according
to the Divine Wisdom, by which God knows what is proper and becoming both
to his mercy and his severity, and (2.) according to Divine Justice, by
which He is prepared to adopt whatever his wisdom may prescribe and put
it in execution.
IV. To these succeeds the fourth decree, by which God decreed to save and
damn certain particular persons. This decree has its foundation in the foreknowledge
of God, by which he knew from all eternity those individuals who would,
through his preventing grace, believe, and, through his subsequent grace
would persevere, according to the before described administration of those
means which are suitable and proper for conversion and faith; and, by which
foreknowledge, he likewise knew those who would not believe and persevere.
Predestination, when thus explained, is
1. The foundation of Christianity, and of salvation and its certainty.
2. It is the sum and the matter of the gospel; nay, it is the gospel itself,
and on that account necessary to be believed in order to salvation, as far
as the two first articles are concerned.
3. It has had no need of being examined or determined by any council, either
general or particular, since it is contained in the scriptures clearly and
expressly in so many words; and no contradiction has ever yet been offered
to it by any orthodox Divine.
4. It has constantly been acknowledged and taught by all Christian teachers
who held correct and orthodox sentiments.
5. It agrees with that harmony of all confessions, which has been published
by the protestant Churches.
6. It likewise agrees most excellently with the Dutch Confession and Catechism.
This concord is such, that if in the Sixteenth article these two expressions
"those persons whom" and "others," be explained by the
words "believers" and "unbelievers" these opinions of
mine on Predestination will be comprehended in that article with the greatest
clearness. This is the reason why I directed the thesis to be composed in
the very words of the Confession, when, on one occasion, I had to hold a
public disputation before my private class in the University. This kind
of Predestination also agrees with the reasoning contained in the twentieth
and the fifty-fourth question of the Catechism.
7. It is also in excellent accordance with the nature of God -- with his
wisdom, goodness, and righteousness; because it contains the principal matter
of all of them, and is the clearest demonstration of the Divine wisdom,
goodness, and righteousness [or justice]
8. It is agreeable in every point with the nature of man -- in what form
soever that nature may be contemplated, whether in the primitive state of
creation, in that of the fall, or in that of restoration.
9. It is in complete concert with the act of creation, by affirming that
the creation itself is a real communication of good, both from the intention
of God, and with regard to the very end or event; that it had its origin
in the goodness of God; that whatever has a reference to its continuance
and preservation, proceeds from Divine love; and that this act of creation
is a perfect and appropriate work of God, in which he is at complaisance
with himself, and by which he obtained all things necessary for an unsinning
state.
10. It agrees with the nature of life eternal, and with the honourable titles
by which that life is designated in the scriptures.
11. It also agrees with the nature of death eternal, and with the names
by which that death is distinguished in scripture.
12. It states sin to be a real disobedience, and the meritorious cause of
condemnation; and on this account, it is in the most perfect agreement with
the fall and with sin.
13. In every particular, it harmonizes with the nature of grace, by ascribing
to it all those things which agree with it, [or adapted to it,] and by reconciling
it most completely to the righteousness of God and to the nature and liberty
of the human will.
14. It conduces most conspicuously to declare the glory of God, his justice
and his mercy. It also represents God as the cause of all good and of our
salvation, and man as the cause of sin and of his own damnation.
15. It contributes to the honour of Jesus Christ, by placing him for the
foundation of Predestination and the meritorious as well as communicative
cause of salvation.
16. It greatly promotes the salvation of men: It is also the power, and
the very means which lead to salvation -- by exciting and creating within
the mind of man sorrow on account of sin, a solicitude about his conversion,
faith in Jesus Christ, a studious desire to perform good works, and zeal
in prayer -- and by causing men to work out their salvation with fear and
trembling. It likewise prevents despair, as far as such prevention is necessary.
17. It confirms and establishes that order according to which the gospel
ought to be preached, (1.) By requiring repentance and faith -- (2.) And
then by promising remission of sins, the grace of the spirit, and life eternal.
18. It strengthens the ministry of the gospel, and renders it profitable
with respect to preaching, the administration of the sacraments and public
prayers.
19. It is the foundation of the Christian religion; because in it, the two-fold
love of God may be united together -- God's love of righteousness [or justice],
and his love of men, may, with the greatest consistency, be reconciled to
each other.
20. Lastly. This doctrine of Predestination, has always been approved by
the great majority of professing Christians, and even now, in these days,
it enjoys the same extensive patronage. It cannot afford any person just
cause for expressing his aversion to it; nor can it give any pretext for
contention in the Christian Church.
It is therefore much to be desired, that men would proceed no further in
this matter, and would not attempt to investigate the unsearchable judgments
of God -- at least that they would not proceed beyond the point at which
those judgments have been clearly revealed in the scriptures.
This, my most potent Lords, is all that I intend now to declare to your
mightinesses, respecting the doctrine of Predestination, about which there
exists such a great controversy in the Church of Christ. If it would not
prove too tedious to your Lordships, I have some other propositions which
I could wish to state, because they contribute to a full declaration of
my sentiments, and tend to the same purpose as that for which I have been
ordered to attend in this place by your mightinesses.
There are certain other articles of the Christian religion, which possess
a close affinity to the doctrine of Predestination, and which are in a great
measure dependent on it: Of this description are the providence of God,
the free- will of man, the perseverance of saints, and the certainty of
salvation. On these topics, if not disagreeable to your mightinesses, I
will in a brief manner relate my opinion.
By Salvidor Hayworth
